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Squeezing the Middleman:
Ending Underhanded Dealing in the Pharmacy
Benefit Management Industry Through Regulation
Mark Meador*
I. INTRODUCTION

The purchase of prescription medicine for the average consumer is often
a simple process-and in some cases, an expensive one.' For businesses in
the healthcare industry, it is complex and highly profitable.2 To patients, it
appears they are purchasing medication from a pharmacy-with their
doctor's permission-and are simultaneously or subsequently reimbursed
for their expense by their insurance company. In reality, their purchase is
the end result of an extensive process of contract negotiation, cost-benefit
analysis, corporate haggling, manufacturer rebates, and the artful
salesmanship of pharmacy benefit managers. While simplified transactions
are ordinarily beneficial to consumers, in the case of prescription drugs they
conceal unnecessarily inflated prices.
At a time when the political winds are driving the sails of healthcare
reform, transparency is essential to determining how and where to lower
costs in the industry. While many look to health insurers, a more worthy
A.B., University of Chicago, Philosophy, 2007; J.D. expected May 2011, University of
Houston Law Center. The author is the Editor-in-Chief of the Houston Business and Tax
Law Journal. He would like to thank Professor Darren Bush for his feedback and comments
during the writing of this article.
1. OECD in Figures 2009, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEv., http://www.oecdlibrary.org/economics/ oecd-in-figures-2009_oif-2009-en ("Health spending and resources"
hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 19, 2010) (calculating that Americans spent $7,290 per capita on
health care in 2007).
2. Allison Garrett & Robert Garis, Leveling the Playing Field in the Pharmacy Benefit
Management Industry, 42 VAL. U. L. REv. 33, 36-37 (2007) ("In 2006, Express Scripts had a
net income of $474 million on revenues of $17.7 billion, Medco Health Solutions, Inc. made
$630 million on revenues of $42.5 billion during the same period, and Caremark RX, Inc.
made $1.1 billion on revenues of $36.8 billion in 2006"). 1 am greatly indebted to the
authors of this piece for their thorough survey of the PBM industry and its inner workings.
As will be seen below, however, additional information concerning the legal issues involved
in the industry leads to the conclusion that their concluding prescription is woefully
inadequate.
3. Mark J. Botti, Chief, Litig. I Section U.S. Dep't of Justice, Antitrust Div.,
Competition in Healthcare and Certificates of Need, Prepared Testimony Before the General
Assembly of the State of Georgia (Feb. 23, 2007), in 6 HEALTH CARE & ANTITRUST L. app.
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starting point would be the sale and distribution of prescription drugs. 4 This
paper examines the pharmacy benefit management industry by describing
its operation, analyzing potential antitrust and other legal concerns involved
in its ties to health plan sponsors, prescription drug manufacturers, and
pharmacies, and evaluating existing proposals for regulating the industry to
lower costs for health plan sponsors and consumers. These topics have
been the subject of frequent litigation and investigation for the past several
years, on both the state and federal levels. This paper argues that the
problems discussed herein are systemic and thus require direct regulation,
rather than remedial litigation, in order to curb abuses in the industry.
To that end, this paper concludes with a proposal for legislation requiring
pricing limitations and manufacturer rebate transparency designed to lower
prescription drug costs and place restrictions on pharmacy benefit
management behavior that will not rely on risky statutory interpretation.
While these proposals may not address any latent inefficiencies in the
research and manufacturing sector of the prescription drug industry, they
would represent significant steps towards cutting costs and eliminating
waste in the American healthcare system.
1I. THE PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGEMENT INDUSTRY

Pharmacy benefit management companies (PBMs) are, in essence, the
middlemen of the prescription drug industry.5 They coordinate the sale and
reimbursement of prescription drugs between health insurance plan
sponsors or employers, drug manufacturers, and local and national
Plan sponsors and employers hire PBMs to design and
pharmacies.
administer plans for prescription drug benefits for their members or

E145 (2010).

4. OECD in Figures 2009, supra note I (Pharmaceuticals comprise twelve percent of
healthcare spending in the United States); Calvin Woodward, FACT CHECK: Health Insurer
Profits Not So Fat, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 25, 2009, availableat http://www.foxnews.con
politics/2009/1 0/26/fact-check-health-insurers-profits-fat/ (explaining that, contrary to
popular belief, health insurance companies have not been seeing large profits.); see, e.g.,
Russ Britt, Health care's healthy decade, MARKETWATCH (Nov. 19, 2009, 7:34 p.m. EST),
availableat http://www.marketwatch.com/story/health-care-ends-bonanza-decade-on-brightnote-2009-ll-19?link=kiosk (attributing part of the economic growth to far greater profits
realized in the pharmaceuticals industry); Barbara Martinez et al., As Health Middlemen
Thrive, Employers Try to Tame Them, WALL ST. J., Dec. 29, 2006, at Al (noting that, in
2005, "[t]he three largest pharmaceutical benefit managers, for instance, had net income of
$1.9 billion").
5. Christy Rentmeester & Robert Garis, Commentary-Reply to Malley, 33 J. HEALTH
POL. POL'Y & L. 975,976 (2008).
6. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 34; Regina Sharlow Johnson, PBMs: Ripe For
Regulation, 57 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 323, 327 (2002).
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employees. 7 In return, PBMs provide industry-specific knowledge not
found in most human resources departments, as well as negotiating power
(because of their large patient base) to secure rebates and discounts from
Most PBMs also offer various
drug manufacturers and pharmacies.
administrative services on a fee basis, and many run their own mail-order
pharmacies. 9 Overall, in selecting a PBM to manage its members' health
benefits, "[t]he primary concerns of the health plan typically include
pricing, customer service, and pharmacy plan design."' 0
A. Pricing
As is to be expected, the PBM business model centers largely on pricing
mechanisms. While PBMs once operated primarily on a fee basis, recent
decades have seen a shift to a more complex, and more profitable, business
model." This model revolves around three important pricing measures for
brand name prescription drugs: Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC),
Average Wholesale Price (AWP), and Average Manufacturer Price
(AMP).12 The WAC is the industry equivalent to a manufacturer suggested
retail price or catalog price and is only occasionally relevant to pricing
prescription drugs.13 The AWP is an industry-wide published list of prices,
ostensibly for wholesalers selling to pharmacies.14 Pharmacies do not
actually pay this rate, however, and instead use the AWP as the basis for the
price they charge to PBMs, health plans, and government programs, all of
which typically negotiate a percentage discount.' 5 Lastly, the AMP is the
average price actually paid to manufacturers by wholesalers and
pharmacies, including any rebates or discounts (but not rebates to PBMs).' 6
7. Johnson, supra note 6, at 327.
8. See infra Part II.B.
9. Johnson, supra note 6, at 327 (explaining that the administrative services include drug
utilization reviews and data mining); Garrett & Garis, supra note 2 at 37. Because this paper
focuses primarily on prescription drug coverage, however, it will not actively discuss
administrative services.
10. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 39.
11. Christy Rentmeester & Robert Garis, Rebates and Spreads: Pharmacy Benefit
Management Practicesand Corporate Citizenship, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 943, 946
(2008) [hereinafter Rebates & Spreads].
12. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PRESCRIPTION DRUG PRICING IN THE PRIVATE SECTOR 3 (Jan.
2007) [hereinafter CBO REPORT].
13. Id. (stating that the WAC is useful primarily when single-source drugs are involved
and the price approximates AWP).
14. Id; Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 39.
15. CBO REPORT, supra note 12, at 3; PHARMACY BENEFIT MGMT. INST., PRESCRIPTION
available at
DRUG BENEFIT COST AND PLAN DESIGN REPORT 20 (2008-09),
http://www.pbmi.com/2008 report/index.html [hereinafter 2008 PBMI Report].
16. CBO REPORT, supra note 12, at 3; PHARMACY BENEFIT MGMT INST., PRESCRIPTION
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The Congressional Budget Office has modeled the relationship between
these prices in the following chart:' 7

. Maufacturers
n

AMP

V/oesalers

.

AMP

Payment Basedon AWP (for single-source drugs);
soWtiCes, the WACis also used

Consumers
Consumers Paying for
Purchases Out of Pocket

Consumers Who Have Som or All Purchases
Paid for by aThird Party (including health plaits, Medicaid
Medicare, and the apartmee of Defense)

In addition to these pricing indices, PBMs that negotiate with phaesacies and
design plans for sponsors also take into consideration rebates they receive from
in Part 1-1-i, PBMs do not
drug manufacturers. 18sAs will be further discussed
19
always reveal these rebates to the other parties.
Generic drugs are subject to a different price list, the Maximum Allowable Cost
20
(MAC). Unlike the AWP, however, there is no one standard MAC price list, but
rather a range of acceptable prices.21 While they view the MAC as "an upper

available at
BENEFIT COST AND PLAN DESIGN REPORT 25 (2009-2010),
http://benefitdesignreport.com [hereinafter 2009 PBMI REPORT].
17. CBO REPORT, supra note 12, at 5, 8 (showing that about thirty percent of the
manufacturer's supply goes directly to chain (retail) pharmacies, while sixty-four percent
goes through wholesalers).
18. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 44 ("In effect, the manufacturers pay PBMs to
increase their market shares.").
19. See Allan Zimmerman, True Transparency:PBM Cost-ControlModel of the Future,
DRUG

43 BENEFITS & COMPENSATION DIG. (Int'l Found. of Emp. Benefit Plans), No. 10, Oct. 2006

at 1, available at http://www.ifebp.org/pdf/ webexclusive/06oct.pdf.
20. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 40 (explaining that the MAC is "often expressed as
an aggregate discount off the AWP").
21. Id. at 40.
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payment limit,"22 most plan sponsors are unaware that "PBMs use lower MAC
prices to reimburse pharmacies, while charging them higher MAC prices,
increasing the spread retained by the PBM."23 This, too, will be discussed further
in Part II-B-2. Given the complexity of this web of transactions, it is helpful to
depict their relationships graphically24
Negotiated
Rebatefor
Brand-Name
Drugs

AMP

Drug Manufacturer

Drugs
..............

Preferred Placement on

I

J......

Wholesaler

IFormulary.................................

.......

Drugs
(For example,[AWP- 15%]
Negot d Payment

* Pharmacy Benefit
ManagerdPayment

a Drugt

IBenefits

A.V.....

:VAC

S)

Shareof Rebatesfrom
*Manufacturer

Drugs

Copaynment

DrugCoverage

Health Plan

Premium
a---

Premium
a
Prmu

Employer

---

Beneficiary
w--of--Fun-s-- - ------Flow of Funds

- - - - - - - - - - -

Flowof Prescription Drugs

B. Rebate and Discount Strategies
PBMs turn a profit on prescription drug transactions through three main
strategies, each guided by the pricing indices above: manufacturer rebates,
generic pricing spreads, and formulary design. 2 5
As previously noted, PBMs negotiate a percentage discount off AWP as
the reimbursement rate to pharmacies for a given drug.26 This discount is
shared when the PBM charges the plan sponsor whose member or employee
purchased the prescription.
Accordingly, the discount that a PBM can
secure from pharmacies is key to attracting clients looking for the lowest
Id. (quoting CBO REPORT, supra note 12, at Glossary).
Id; Johnson, supra note 6, at 328 (explaining how PBMs generate revenue).
24. CBO REPORT, supra note 12, at 11.
25. Id; Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 37; Johnson, supra note 6, at 328. ("A
formulary is a listing of preferred prescription drugs that a health plan predetermines will be
covered for reimbursement under the terms of its plan.").
26. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 39; CBO REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.
27. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 43-44.
22.
23.
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prices. 28 Theoretically, the better the discounts a PBM can secure, the
29
Somewhat conversely, the more patients
bigger the clients it can attract.
covered under a PBM's plans, the more leverage it has to get pharmacies to
offer lower rates, lest they be excluded from the PBM's patients' business. 3 0
1. Rebates
While exacting deep discounts from pharmacies helps PBMs to cut costs
by sharing in the discounts with plan sponsors, the real money is made
through rebates from drug manufacturers. 3' Manufacturers will offer
rebates to PBMs based on how much the PBM increases the manufacturer's
market share for a given drug. 3 2 The catch is that the PBMs are not
required to share information about these rebates with plan sponsors, and in
the vast majority of cases do not. 3 Instead, they pocket some or all of the
money saved.34
2. Generic Pricing Spreads
Similarly, PBMs take advantage of the spread in various MAC price lists
for generic drugs. By negotiating with manufacturers using a lower-priced
list and then setting reimbursement rates with plan sponsors using a higherpriced list, the PBMs are able to create a spread that is pure profit.35 When
plan sponsors insist on receiving a greater portion of rebates secured from
manufacturers, PBMs can offset this by inflating the MAC prices for
generics. 36 As an indication of how substantial these amounts can be, in
August of 2009 the U.S. Military's healthcare provider, TRICARE,
announced that it anticipated saving $1.67 billion in 2010 by negotiating its
own pharmacy benefits instead of using a PBM for its nine million
beneficiaries.37
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Id. at 39 (discussing the relationship between PBMs and health plans).
Id; CBO REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.
Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 46; Johnson, supra note 6, at 331-32.
Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 36; Johnson, supra note 6, at 328.
See generally CBO REPORT, supranote 15.
Zimmerman, supra note 19, at 1.
Id; Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 37, n. 18.
Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 40.
Id. (This price measure may become even more important in the future, as the use of

generic increases); Vijay Vaitheeswaran, Generically Challenged, THE EcONOMIST: THE
WORLD IN2010, Nov. 2009, at 130.

37. Kevin Schweers, Community PharmacistsHear Mail Order Complaints; Debunk
PBM Myths, NCPA COMMENTARY (Sept. 23, 2009), http://www.ncpanet.org/index.php/ncpacommentary/385-community-pharmacists-hear-mail-order-complaints-debunk-pbm-myths;
Press Release, TRICARE, TRICARE Obtains Lower Prices on Retail Prescription Drugs,
(Aug. 4, 2009), http://www.tricare.mil/pressroom/news.aspx?fid=548.
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3. Formulary Design
Lastly, but significantly, PBMs can amplify the benefits of rebate
concealment and spread profits through the careful construction of
formularies. 38 A formulary is the heart of the plan that sponsors hire PBMs
to design for their members or employees.3 9 The formulary dictates which
drugs are covered and what their co-pays are. 4 0 The most common type of
formulary is a three-tier plan, used by 67.2 percent of employers that hire
PBMs. 4 1 The first tier is for generic drugs and has the lowest co-pay, while
the second and third tiers are for preferred and non-preferred brand-name
drugs, respectively. 42 The second tier, preferred brand-name drugs, is
largely comprised of drugs for which PBMs receive the deepest rebates
from drug manufacturers for increasing their market share. 4 3 The third tier,
44
non-preferred brand-name drugs, has the highest co-pays.
The Pharmacy Benefit Management Institute, a group for "health care
purchasers, pharmacy benefit managers, and other industry professionals
involved in the delivery of drug benefits," 45 found that "52.3% of employers
perceive the nature of the financial relationship with their PBM to be
transparent." 46 This misconception makes it even easier for PBMs to create
a preference for drugs and generics that yield the greatest rebates and
profits.47 What is more, this arrangement actually incentivizes PBMs to
promote the drugs for which they receive the largest per-prescription rebate,
rather than the cheapest or best-value prescription. 48 For example, assume
drug A costs $50 and the PBM will keep $5 of the rebate from the
manufacturer, while drug B costs $100 and the PBM will keep $6 of the
rebate. The PBM has an incentive to promote drug B, even though drug A
is more cost efficient for the plan sponsor, because it will see a larger
rebate. The exception to this is a generic alternative with a spread in MAC
pricing greater than the rebate the PBM will see; in that case the patient will

38. Garrett & Garis,supra note 2, at 43-44; Johnson, supra note 6, at 331.
39. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 43-44.
40. Id; 2009 PBMI REPORT, supra note 16, at 14.
41. 2009 PBMI REPORT, supra note 16, at 14 (explaining that some plans have extra
tiers for specialty and lifestyle drugs).
42. Id.
43. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 44-46.
44. Id.
45. About Us, PHARM. BENEFIT MGMT. INST., http://www.pbmi.com/aboutus.asp (last
visited Dec. 19, 2010).
46. 2008 PBMI Report, supra note 15, at 7.
47. Id.
48. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 43.
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likely choose the lower co-pay option. 4 9 As shown by these incentives, the
formulary is a key tool by which PBMs can increase their profit rate.
C. Mail-OrderPharmacies
In addition to these strategies, many PBMs also operate their own mailorder pharmacies.so Mail-order pharmacies offer patients with recurring
prescriptions greater convenience and lower co-pays than traditional retail
pharmacies.5 1 For PBMs, they are an opportunity for even greater revenue.
Because PBMs are acting as the pharmacy in this case, the spread between
MAC prices is even greater than when dealing with a retail pharmacy.52
PBMs can also direct prescriptions to their own mail-order facilities instead
of to competitors, in order to maximize their gains on the higher MAC
spreads and rebates from manufacturers for brand-name drugs-even if the
competitor could do it at a lower cost to the plan sponsor.5 ' Rebates for
mail-order drugs are often larger as well, providing the PBMs with an
incentive to encourage the use of mail-order pharmacies over retail
pharmacies, regardless of the risk of waste. 54 Additionally, PBM-owned
mail-order pharmacies often contact doctors to encourage them to switch a
patient to an alternative drug that is on the patient's formulary or, if generic,
has a higher MAC spread. 5
Understanding the structure of the PBM industry, the relationships
among its participants, and the strategies employed in the industry is
essential to highlighting the problems and concerns that many of these
practices raise. The rest of this paper examines the operation of the PBM
industry in the light of federal and state laws, discusses potential violations,
and addresses possible solutions related to the way the industry works.
III. ANTITRUST AND OTHER CONCERNS

Understandably, some have challenged the practices outlined above as

49. Id. at 43-45 (PBMs, however, rarely notify plan participants about new generic
versions of medication they are taking).
50. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 66.
51.

2009 PBMI REPORT, supra note 16, at 12; see generally FED. TRADE COMM'N,

PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-ORDER PHARMACIES i (Aug. 2005),

available

at

http://wwwftc.gov/reports/pharmbenefit05/050906pharmbenefitrpt.pdf

[hereinafter FTC PBM REPORT].

52. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 67.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 67-68; 2009 PBMI REPORT, supra note 16, at 28.
55. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 67; Johnson, supra note 6, at 332 ("In a survey of
248 physicians in New York, 83% of these physicians reported that they had been contacted
by a health plan, or a PBM pharmacist, to switch a prescription.").
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violating antitrust and other state and federal laws.56 And, in fact, plaintiffs
in recent litigation have agreed and pursued such claims.5 7 Plaintiffs have
also alleged that the PBMs' behavior violates other state and federal laws,
including consumer protection laws and the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA). This section will discuss and examine these matters
as a way of highlighting and dissecting alleged abuses in the industry.
A. Investigations and Litigated Claims
Of the dominant firms in the industry, three of the leaders have been
under scrutiny in recent years: Caremark Pharmacy Services (Caremark),
Medco Health Solutions (Medco), and Express Scripts.58 As of the first
quarter of 2009, these three firms had market shares of 12.02 percent, 8.79
percent, and 8.06 percent of beneficiaries, respectively, and 15.09 percent,
14.86 percent, and 10.66 percent of prescriptions per year, respectively. 5 9
Collectively, this represents 28.67 percent of market share and 40.61
percent of prescriptions per year. An examination of litigation and
settlements involving these three firms brings to light several of the antitrust
and other legal concerns surrounding the PBM industry.
1. Sherman Act Violations
The Sherman Antitrust Act forbids "[e]very contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy" that restrains trade60 and makes
illegal monopolization and attempts to monopolize.6 ' Between 2003 and

56.
DAVID BALTO, REVIVING COMPETITION IN HEALTHCARE MARKETS: THE USE OF
SECTION 5 OF THE FTC

ACT, Before the FTC WORKSHOP: SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT AS A COMPETITION LAW (Oct.

17, 2008), available at http://www.ftc.gov/bc/workshops/section5/docs/dbalto.pdf, Johnson,
supra note 6 at 337, et seq.; JOHN NICHOLAS DEMOS & STEWART STEWART, AN ASSESSMENT
OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION CONFLICT OF INTEREST STUDY I, xvi (2006), available
at http://www.ncpanet.org/pdf/ftcassessment-exsum.pdf.
57. Class Action Complaint at 5-6, Brady Enters., Inc. v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc.,
(No. 03-4730) 2003 WL 23902806 (E.D. Pa. 2004); In Re Pharmacy Benefit Managers
Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432 (3d Cir. 2009) (vacating an order by the transferee judge to
vacate previous judge's order to compel arbitration between Bellevue Drug Co. and
AdvancePCS); In Re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litigation, 06-md-01782-JFALL (E.D. Pa Feb. 21, 2007) (the other parties had been previously required to file new
petitions for class certification).
58. Garret & Garis, supra note 2, at 36, nn.12, 14 (explaining that Caremark is a
subsidiary of CVS and Medco was formerly of Merck).
59. Top 25 Pharmacy Benefit Management Companies and Market Share By
Membership, as of 1st Quarter 2009, PHARM. BENEFIT MGMT. INST., http://www.pbmi.com/
PBMmarketshare l.asp (last visited Dec. 19, 2010) [hereinafter Top 25 PBMs].
60. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
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2005, several independent pharmacies filed class action suits against one or
more of the three PBM industry leaders-Medco, Caremark, and Express
Scripts-alleging violations under Sections 1 and 2 of the Shennan Act. 62
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these six cases
and transferred them to the Eastern District of Pennsylvania in 2006.63 The
case is still under way, with at least one of the six cases in compelled
arbitration. 4 Each of the cases, and their accompanying allegations, are
discussed below.
In 2004, North Jackson Pharmacy alleged violations of both Sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act by the PBMs. 65 In one of its two complaints filed
in the Northern District of Alabama, North Jackson accused Express Scripts
of conspiring with other PBMs to fix prices and to monopolize the market
for insurance-covered prescription drugs.
The complaint alleged these
Sherman Act violations were undertaken through coordination with other
PBMs (including Medco and Caremark) and resulted in "horizontal
restraints of trade, and monopolization," specifically, sub-competitive
reimbursement rates for independent pharmacies (and thus supracompetitive profits for the PBMs).67 To support their allegations, the
62. N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ala.
2004); N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., No. 5:03-2697, 2004 WL
3372978 (N.D. Ala. 2004); N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Caremark RX Inc., 385 F.2d 740
(N.D. Ill. 2005); Brady Enters., Inc. v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc., No. 03-4730, 2003 WL
23902806 (E.D. Pa. 2003); Bellevue Drug Co. v. AdvancePCS, 333 F. Supp. 2d 318 (E.D.
Pa. 2004).
63. In Re Pharm. Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 452 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L.
2006).
64. In Re Pharm. Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 582 F.3d 432 (3rd Cir. 2009)
(vacating an order by the transferee judge to vacate previous judge's order to compel
arbitration between Bellevue Drug Co. and AdvancePCS). In Re Pharm. Benefit Managers
Antitrust Litig., 06-md-01782-JF-ALL (E.D. Pa Feb. 21, 2007) (the other parties had been
previously required to file new petitions for class certification).
65. First Am. Class Action Complaint at 13, N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Express Scripts,
Inc., 345 F. Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (No. 5:03-2696).
66. Id. ("Defendant has combined, conspired and/or agreed with other parties to
unreasonably restrain trade in violation of Sections [sic] I of the Sherman Act by price
fixing schemes. Defendant has also violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act by conspiring
with other parties to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the United States market for
dispensing and retail sale of prescription drugs that are reimbursed by insurance."). North
Jackson Pharmacy also filed a complaint against Medco alleging nearly identical violations.
First Amended Class Action Complaint at 16, N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Medco Health
Solutions, Inc., No. 5:03-2697, 2004 WL 3372978 (N.D. Ala. 2004).
67. First Am. Class Action Complaint, supra note 66, at 14. See generally Milt
Freudenheim, Drug-PlanManager, Caremark, To Buy a Rivalfor $5.6 Billion, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 3, 2003, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/ 09/03/business/drug-planmanager-caremark-to-buy-a-rival-for-5.6-billion.html (discussing Caremark's purchase of
AdvancePCS); see also CVS Caremark History, CVS CAREMARK http://info.cvs
caremark.com/our-company/history.
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plaintiffs pointed to the prevalence of "substantially similar contracts" used
by each of the PBMs that required pharmacies to submit to "detrimental
pricing schemes." 6 8 Additionally, they accused the PBMs of formulary
manipulation to promote needlessly expensive drugs whose cost was more
of a burden to the pharmacies. 69 The plaintiffs further alleged that the
PBMs used the pharmacies' data to divert their customers to the PBMs'
own mail-order pharmacies and that they concealed the rebates and
discounts received from drug manufacturers. 70 Lastly, the plaintiffs accused
Express Scripts and others of "impos[ing] unconscionable and punitively
low reimbursement rates on member pharmacies."71 The plaintiffs argued
that these activities were possible because the PBMs share their rates with
one another, and with eighty percent of the industry participating in "an
entity called Hub RX through which they are able to share competitive and
pricing information." 72
Expanding on their accusation that PBMs diverted prescriptions from
independent pharmacies to their own mail-order pharmacies, the plaintiffs
accused Express Scripts and other PBMs of "impos[ing] anti-competitive
restrictions on the activities of retail pharmacists that could not exist in an
open market" and setting "arbitrary limitations on a pharmacist's ability to
refill prescriptions in order to divert this profitable segment of the
prescription drug market to defendant's own mail-order business."73 They
further accused PBMs of prohibiting independent pharmacies from filling
more than a month's supply for a drug, while allowing their own mail-order
pharmacies to fill up to a 90-day supply for a prescription at a lower rate.74
These practices, the plaintiffs said, "[deprive them] of the most profitable
portion of their business." 75 Altogether, North Jackson Pharmacy's
allegations against the PBMs centered on the cartel-like behavior of
conspiring to force independent pharmacies to accept sub-competitive
reimbursement rates, while attempting to monopolize the mail-order
pharmacy sector of their business. 7 6
In the Northern District of Illinois, North Jackson Pharmacy filed a third

68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
selling
75.
76.

First Am. Class Action Complaint, supra note 66 at 14-15.
Id at 15.
Id
Id
Id. at 17.
Id. at 17-18.
First Am. Class Action Complaint, supra note 66 at 18 (finding that the PBMs were
a ninety day supply for less than the price of three thirty-day co-pays).
See id
Id.
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suit under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, this time against Caremark.77
There, North Jackson alleged "a conspiracy between Plan Sponsors, using
Caremark as their 'common agent,' to fix the prices paid independent
pharmacies for dispensing prescription drugs to Plan Subscribers" and "a
conspiracy between Caremark and PBMs with which it competes to fix
those same prices." 7 8
In the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, Brady Enterprises filed a
complaint against Medco, alleging horizontal price-fixing as well as issues
concerning vertical integration. 7 9 The plaintiff pointed out that Medco,
through its own mail-order pharmacies, competes with the pharmacies with
which it contracts.80 This, along with the aggregate market power of
Medco's plan sponsors, allows Medco to "create artificial advantages for its
own dispensing activities" and divert sales to its own mail-order pharmacy
network.81 These practices, the plaintiff alleged, "have the purpose and
effect of artificially fixing, depressing, standardizing, and stabilizing" the
reimbursement rates for independent pharmacies and are violations of
Section 1 of the Sherman Act.82
Finally, Bellevue Drug Co. also filed suit in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, against AdvancePCS (which was later acquired by
Caremark),83 alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman Act and
Sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. 84 Like Brady Enterprises, Bellevue
claimed that AdvancePCS used its "aggregated economic power . .. to set
reimbursement rates for retail pharmacies' brand name and prescription
drugs and dispensing services below that which would prevail in a
competitive marketplace."85 Although they did not allege a conspiracy with
plan sponsors, Bellevue did claim that the plan sponsors were aware of the
In addition, Bellevue reiterated the allegations made in the
practices.
above-mentioned cases regarding Advance PCS' mail-order pharmacy

77. N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Caremark RX, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 2d 740 (N.D. Ill. 2005).
78. Id. at 744.
79. Class Action Complaint at 5-6, Brady Enters., Inc. v. Medco Health Solutions, Inc.
(No. 03-4730), 2003 WL 23902806 (E.D. Pa. 2003).
80. Id. at 7.
8 1. Id.
82. Id. at 26.
83. Integration of Advance PCS and Caremark, CVS CAREMARK, https://www.care
mark.com/wps/portal/FAQS _CUSTOMERCARE?cms=CMS-2-009273 (last visited Dec.
19, 2010).
84. Bellevue Drug Co. v. Advance PCS, No. 03-4731, 2004 WL 724490 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
2, 2004).
85. Id. at *1.
86. Id
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2. Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
PBMs have also been subject to litigation under Section 5 of the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), and equivalent state consumer
protection laws, which forbids "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce."8 In 2008, Attorneys General from 28 states and the
District of Columbia entered into settlements with Express Scripts and
Caremark after alleging various deceptive trade practices by each
company.89 Following an investigation that began in 2004, both PBMs
were accused of engaging in deceptive trade practices by encouraging
doctors to switch patients to preferred drugs and by concealing and
retaining profits from these switches and from manufacturer rebates. 90 As
noted previously, PBMs stand to earn substantial profits by encouraging the
use of a formulary's preferred drugs and drugs for which the PBM receives
larger rebates from manufacturers.91
In its complaint against Caremark, the State of Washington specifically
accused the PBM of withholding pertinent details regarding drug switches,
including financial incentives, and of "[flailing to require that its
pharmacists form an independent, professional judgment about the
propriety of a drug switch before proposing it." 92 These practices, the
complaint alleged, grew out of Caremark's strategy of persuading doctors to
switch their patients to drugs for which Caremark would receive greater
rebates. 9 3 Express Scripts was accused of similar conduct. 94

87. Class Action Compl. at 6, Bellevue Drug Co. v. Advance PCS, 333 F. Supp. 2d. 318
(E.D. Pa. 2003) (No. 2:03-4731).
88. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2010); Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 56, nn. 122-23.
89. Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen. Lisa Madigan, 28 Attorneys General Reach Settlement
with Caremark for Drug Switching Practices (Feb. 14, 2008), available at
20080214.html (The states
http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2008_02/
included: Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Delaware, District of Columbia,
Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, and Washington).
90. See, e.g., Press Release, Wash. Att'y Gen. Rob McKenna, Attorney General
McKenna Announces Caremark to pay $41 Million to Resolve Multistate Consumer
Protection Claims (Feb. 14, 2008), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/pressrelease.aspx?
&id=19122; Compl. For Inj. And Other Relief Under The Consumer Protection Act, RCW
19.86, State v. Caremark Rx, LLC, No. 08-2-06098-5 (Wash. Feb. 14, 2008).
91. 2009 PBMI REPORT, supra note 16 at 8; see supra notes 32-42 and accompanying
text.
92. Compl. For Inj. And Other Relief Under The Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86,
supra note 90, at 7.
93. Id.
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As part of their settlements and consent decrees, Caremark and Express
Scripts were required to pay $41 million and $9.5 million, respectively, and
to make substantial changes to their operation. 5 Specifically, the consent
decrees required the two PBMs to end a litany of practices involving drug
switches.96 In addition, both companies were required to make a series of
financial incentive disclosures and reimbursements in each case of drug
switching, as well as to monitor associated health risks and adopt a code of
ethics for their employees.97 In the case of Caremark, these provisions
apply for only five years and then end. 98 The agreement with Express
Scripts, in a similar fashion, only requires Express Scripts to certify its
compliance with the agreement on an annual basis for five years. 9 9
94. See Order Approving Entry of Assurance of Discontinuance, In re Express Scripts,
Inc., No. 08-2-0155-4 (Wash. May 28, 2008), availableat http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploaded
Files/Home/News[Press Releases/ 2008/ProposedExpressscriptsAOD.pdf.
95. Press Release, Wash. Att'y Gen., Att'y Gen. McKenna Announces Express Scripts
to pay $9.5 Million to Resolve Consumer Protection Claims (May 27, 2008), availableat
http://www.atg.wa.gov/pressrelease. aspx?&id=19850.
96. Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., supra note 89; see also Press Release, Wash. Att'y
Gen., supra note 95. They were:
[p]rohibit[ed] ... from soliciting drug switches when: The cost to the patient will
be greater than the cost of the originally prescribed drug; The originally
prescribed drug has a generic equivalent and the proposed drug does not; The net
drug cost of the proposed drug exceeds the net drug cost of the originally
prescribed drug; The originally prescribed drug's patent is expected to expire
within six months; or The patient was switched from a similar drug within the last
two years.
97. Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., supra note 89; Press Release, Wash. State Att'y Gen.,
supra note 95, at 2 (stating full requirements). The full requirements were to:
Inform patients and prescribers of the effect that a drug switch will have on a
patient's co-payment; Inform prescribers of [the PBM's] financial incentives for
certain drug switches; Inform prescribers of material differences in side effects or
efficacy between prescribed drugs and proposed drugs; Reimburse patients for
out-of-pocket expenses for drug switch-related healthcare costs and notify
patients and prescribers that such reimbursement is available; Obtain express,
verifiable authorization from the prescriber for all drug switches; Inform patients
that they may decline a drug switch and the conditions for receiving the originally
prescribed drug; Monitor the effects of drug switches on the health of patients;
Adopt a code of ethics and professional standards; Refrain from making any
claims of savings for a drug switch to patients or prescribers unless Caremark can
substantiate the claim; Refrain from restocking and re-shipping returned drugs
unless permitted by applicable law; and Inform prescribers that certain visits by
[the PBM's] clinical consultants and promotional materials sent to prescribers are
funded by pharmaceutical manufacturers.
Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., supra note 89; Press Release, Wash. State Att'y Gen., supra
note 95.
98. Consent Decree at 41, State v. Caremark Rx, LLC, No. 08-2-06098-5 (Wash. Feb.
14, 2008), available at http://www.atg.wa.gov/uploadedFiles/Home/News/PressReleases/
2008/CaremarkConsentDecree.pdf (noting that the terms expire in 2013).
99. Order Approving Entry of Assurance of Discontinuance, supranote 94, at 41.
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Such massive investigations on the part of states might lead one to
assume that the FTC has also been involved in policing PBMs. 00 The FTC,
however, has tended-over the objections of observers-to turn a lazy eye
towards potential anti-competitive and market power issues in the PBM
industry. 1
In the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and
Modernization Act of 2003, Congress required the FTC to undertake an
examination of potential conflicts of interest in the operation of mail-order
pharmacies by PBMs.10 2 The FTC described the concerns about vertical
integration between PBMs and their mail-order pharmacies, which they
were directed to examine as
[the] "self-dealing" arrangements [that] purportedly would provide PBMs
an opportunity to manipulate drug dispensing at their mail-order
pharmacies to enhance their own profits at the expense of plans and
members through the three business practices discussed above (lack of
generic substitution and dispensing, interchange to more expensive brand
products, and repackaging of drugs into more expensive units). 0 3
To conduct its investigation, the FTC looked at large PBMs, smaller, and
insurer-owned PBMs, retailer-owned PBMs, and stand-alone retail
pharmacies and the prices they charged plan sponsors for generic drugs.' 04
Finding the data did not support allegations of increased costs to plan
sponsors, the FTC said that any fears of conflicts of interest between PBMs
owning mail-order pharmacies and their plan sponsors were unfounded.'0 5
The FTC's report, however, aimed to determine whether plan sponsors
(specifically, federal employee health benefit programs) paid too much to
PBMs, not whether PBMs paid too little to independent pharmacies or
harmed consumers. o0 The report also specifically abstained from
commenting on whether PBM practices surrounding manufacturer rebates
violate anti-kickback laws.' 0 7 Critics have pointed to these and other

100. BALTO, supra note 56, at 3.
101. Id; see generally David Balto, The FTC Should Issue a Second Request on Express
Scripts' ProposedAcquisition of Wellpoint's PBM Business, AM. ANTITRUST INsT. (2009)
(outlining the need for an FTC investigation of the merger); but see Dinah Wisenberg Brin &
Barbara Martinez, CVS Caremark Says FTC Is Investigating Its Business Practices, WALL
at B5, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/
ST. J., Nov. 6, 2009,
SB 10001424052748704013004574517151078308752.html.
102. Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L.
No. 108-173, tit. XI(B), 117 Stat. 2066, 2071.
103. FTC PBM REPORT, supra note 51, at vi.
104. Id. at iii-iv.
105. Id. at ii.
106. Id. at vi.
107. Id. at viii.
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shortcomings of the FTC's report, going so far as to say that the FTC
"misunderstood the fundamental concern of economists and indeed of
Congress." 0 8
3. Federal Statutory Claims
Though the FTC did not address them at the time, the anti-kickback laws
have, in fact, been the basis of additional investigation and litigation over
the business practices of PBMs.109 The False Claims Act and ERISA have
also taken a central place in accusations of fraud against PBMs."o
Together, these federal statutes have formed the basis of a patchwork-style
of regulation of the PBM industry which, though not ideal, has shed
significant light on the behavior of PBMs and ways to remedy perceived
ills.
i. The False Claims andAnti-Kickback Acts
The False Claims Act (FCA) makes liable for damages any person who
submits "a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval" to the United
States government."' The Anti-Kickback Act of 1986 (AKA) prohibits
anyone from accepting or offering compensation for preferential treatment
relating to a contract with the United States government.l12 Two prominent
settlements in 2005 and 2006 revealed the ways in which PBMs may be
violating these statutes when dealing with government-sponsored health
108. DEMOS & STEWART, supra note 56, at ii. Demos and Stewart's report, prepared for
the National Community Pharmacists Association (NCPA), pulls no punches in
characterizing the FTC's report:
[M]any industry commentators have expressed concern that the FTC conclusions
do not provide a balanced perspective adequate to inform Congress and
policymakers in their endeavors to protect the fiscal integrity of the MMA
prescription drug benefit program. In particular, rather than investigating further,
the FTC seems to ignore and set aside the evidence that they themselves have
surfaced that would have supported the issues raised in the Self Dealing Study.
Further, the FTC methodology has looked at these issues in general terms and
using averages rather than considering specific transactions. In doing so, the FTC
has masked the underlying conflicts of interest that occur on a transaction-bytransaction basis. The methodologies chosen by the FTC, the degree to which the
FTC probed or did not probe in the face of the evidence surfaced and the choice
of conclusions relative to the underlying evidence have led to concern as to the
balance with which the FTC approached The Study.
Id.
109. See, e.g., infra notes 113 and 119 (citing cases brought by the United States against
PBMs).
110. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 113, 119, and 134 (describing suits in
which the United States alleged violations of the FCA and ERISA).
111. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2010).
112. 41 U.S.C. §§ 51-58 (2010).
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programs.
a. AdvancePCS
In 2002, in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the United States filed
suit against AdvancePCS (which was later acquired by Caremark)." 3 The
suit was a whistleblower lawsuit alleging violations of the FCA for
receiving and paying kickbacks, submitting false claims, and retaining
rebates.14 Acting on the information of several former AdvancePCS
employees, the United States alleged that the rebates retained by the PBM
were an "improper reward for favorable treatment in connection with the
contracts into which AdvancePCS entered to provide services for" the
United States government." 5 The United States further alleged that these
practices on the part of AdvancePCS resulted in the submission of false
claims." 6 Following the allegations, AdvancePCS and the United States
entered into a settlement agreement on September 7, 2005.' 17 In addition to
agreeing to pay $137.5 million to the government, AdvancePCS entered
into a Corporate Integrity Agreement (CIA) with several government
departments. 118

b. Merck-Medco
In December 2003, the United States Department of Justice (DOJ) filed a
complaint against Medco (then Merck-Medco, referred to herein as Medco),
also in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, alleging violations of the
FCA.11 9 Several states later joined the DOJ in its suit, alleging violations of
113. DAVID A. BALTO, FEDERAL AND STATE LITIGATION REGARDING PHARMACY BENEFIT
available at
PHARMACISTS
Ass'N
2009),
MANAGERS
2
(NAT'L
CMTY.
http://www.ncpanet.org/pdf/leg/pbmlitigationfeb08.pdf [hereinafter BALTO, LITIGATION];

Consent Order of Court for Injunction and Settlement, U.S. v. AdvancePCS, Nos. 02-CV9236, 02-CV-5425 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 6, 2005), availableat www.crowell.com/pdf/
managedcare/US-v_AdvancePCS_ consent-order.pdf.
114. Id.
115. Settlement Agreement in the case of United States v. AdvancePCS, 1 (2005),
http://www.crowell.com/pdf/ managedcare/US v_AdvancePCSsettlement-agreement.pdf.
116. Id. at 7.
117. Id. at 1.
118. Id. at 9-10, 19. Parties often enter into CIAs as part of a settlement of FCA or AKS
violations where the violating party agrees to certain compliance obligation, usually for a
term of five years. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS,
Corporate Integrity Agreements, http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.asp (last visited Dec. 19,

2010).
119. United States v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d 430, 43436 (E.D. Pa. 2004); see also Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, U.S. Announces $155
Million Settlement of Medco False Claims Case, I (Oct. 23, 2006), http://www.dodig.mil/
iginformationlIGInformationReleases/MEDCO.pdf
[hereinafter DOJ Press Release]
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their equivalent state laws.12 0 The complaint accused Medco of eight years
of defrauding the government by
cancelling and destroying prescriptions, by failing to perform the
professional pharmacists' services needed by patients and required by
law, by switching patients' prescriptions to different drugs without their
knowledge and consent, by shipping medications and billing patients for
drugs they never ordered, by creating false records of contact with
physicians, by soliciting and receiving inducements from pharmaceutical
manufacturers to favor their products by paying kickbacks to obtain
contracts by making improper payments to obtain Medicare contracts,
and by making false and misleading statements to the United States about
its conduct.12 1
The complaint also alleged violations of the Fraud Injunction Statute and
the Anti-Kickback Act.122
Following a denial of Medco's motion to dismiss the suit, the parties
reached a final settlement on October 23, 2006-nearly three years later.12 3
In addition to an earlier payment of $29.1 million to the states,' 24 the
settlement required Medco to pay the United States $155 million.12 5
Medco, like AdvancePCS, also consented to "enter into an extensive
corporate compliance agreement" with several government departments. 126
c. Remedies
Both Medco and AdvancePCS, as part of their settlement agreements,
concurrently entered into consent decrees and nearly identical corporate
integrity agreements (CIAs).m The CIAs entered into by the two PBMs
required them to appoint a compliance officer and a compliance committee
to oversee enforcement of the CIA's terms.1 2 8 Under those terms, each
(explaining that the Department of Justice filed its complaint against Medco on December 3,
2003).
120. Id. at 433-34.
121. Am. Compl. at 1, U.S. v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., 336 F. Supp. 2d
430 (E.D. Pa. 2003) (No. 00-CV-737).
122. Id.
123. BALTO, LITIGATION, supra note 113; see DOJ Press Release, supra note 119.
124. BALTO, LITIGATION, supra note 113.
125. Id.
126. Id. (this agreement expires in 2011).
127. Corp. Integrity Agreement, U.S. v. AdvancePCS, Nos. 02-CV-9236, 02-CV-5425
(E.D. Pa. 2005) available at http://www.ncpanet.org/pdf/legal agreement hhs advance
pcs.pdf; Corporate Integrity Agreement, U.S. v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., No.
00-CV-737, (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2006), available at http://www.secinfo.com/dl4D5a.v6K
lu.a.htm#1stPage.
128. Corp. Integrity Agreement at 4, Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., supra note
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PBM agreed to establish an internal code of conduct that acknowledged
their "commitment to prepare and submit accurate claims" and their
expectation that their employees would conduct themselves accordingly. 12 9
The PBMs were further required to submit written affirmation that each of
their employees had read and understood the code of conduct and that they
had written and distributed internal policies addressing the code of conduct,
as well as the requirements of the FCA and AKA.130 Lastly, Medco and
AdvancePCS were required to submit an annual report on their compliance
for five years following the enforcement date, the duration of the CIAs.13 '
The consent decrees into which Medco and Advance PCS entered
required them to submit to rules and restrictions regarding drug switching
and promoting transparency.132 These included the disclosure of rebates
from manufacturers and other financial incentives, the elimination of MAC
pricing spreads, requirements to inform patients about the effects of drugswitching, and adoption of a code of ethics. 33
ii. ERISA

In addition to claims under the antitrust laws, the FCA, and the AKA,
PBMs have been subject to litigation under ERISA.13 4 ERISA seeks to
protect employees with employer-created benefit plans by imposing
fiduciary responsibilities on certain parties involved in administering the
plan.' 35 Under ERISA, a fiduciary must "discharge his duties with respect
to the plan solely in the interest of the participants and beneficiaries."l 3 6
The central question in the instant context is whether PBMs qualify as
127.
129. Id. at 5.
130. Id at 5-7.
131. Id. at 25.
132. See, e.g., Consent Order of Court for Inj. and Settlement, supra note 113, at 7-18.
133. Id.; Federal Benefits: Are We Meeting Expectations? Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fed. Workforce, Postal Serv., and D.C., 11Oth Cong. (2007) (statement of
Patrick McFarland, Inspector General, U.S. Office of Personnel Management), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/images/stories/documents/20070803145913.pdf.
134. See Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 48-51; Thomas P. O'Donnell & Mark K.
Fendler, Prescriptionor Proscription? The General Failure of Attempts to Litigate and
Legislate Against PBMs as "Fiduciaries," and the Role of Market Forces Allowing PBMs to
Contain Private-SectorPrescriptionDrugPrices, 40 J. HEALTH L. 205 (2007); see generally
David H. Slade, Commentary, ERISA Preemption and the Question of Pharmacy Benefit
Managers' FiduciaryDuty, 30 J. LEGAL MED. 409 (2009).
135. Slade, supra note 134, at n.2 ("The purpose of ERISA is to provide a uniform
regulatory regime over employee benefit plans." (quoting Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542
U.S. 200, 208 (2004))); Employee Retirement Income and Security Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. §
1001 (2006).
136. Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 49 (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (2002)).
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fiduciaries under ERISA. ERISA defines a fiduciary as
any person who exercises any discretionary control or authority over the
management or disposition of plan assets, any person who provides
investment advice for a fee to a plan, or any person who has any
discretionary authority or responsibility over plan administration. 37
PBMs have strongly resisted attempts to classify their operations under
this definition, because it would subject them to stricter standards on their
pricing and rebate strategies.13 A fiduciary that neglects its responsibilities
under ERISA faces liability for damages and equitable relief in suits by
either the Secretary of Labor or individual private plaintiffs.13 9 Many of the
alleged practices cited in suits under the FCA and AKA would likely
constitute violations of ERISA as well, were fiduciary status established.14 0
The answer to this question is not yet clear. According to Thomas
O'Donnell and Mark Fendler, "[w]hile the majority of the federal circuits
and district courts deciding the issue have held that PBMs are not ERISA
'fiduciaries,' one federal circuit has stated otherwise in dicta and many
other courts have left the issues undecided altogether."' 4 ' Nor has the
Supreme Court taken up the issue.14 2
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court addressed how ERISA treats similarly
situated HMOs. In Pegram v. Herdrich, the Supreme Court held that an
HMO is not a fiduciary, pointing to the mixed nature of the HMO's
decisions, which involved eligibility and treatment, as opposed to
traditional fiduciary decisions such as the allocation and maintenance of
plan assets.143 O'Donnell and Fendler explain that "the Supreme Court in
Pegram made it clear that persons making healthcare treatment decisions
under an HMO plan would not be subject to ERISA's fiduciary
obligations."'"
Critics have argued that this deprives patients of a
meaningful recourse against managed care organizations, such as PBMs.14 5
Seven years later, in Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund
v. Caremark, Inc., the Seventh Circuit decided that PBMs also fail to

137.
(2000)).
138.
139.
140.
141.

O'Donnell & Fendler, supra note 134, at 207 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)(A)
Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 49-50.
See 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (2006); O'Donnell & Fendler, supranote 134, at 208.
See discussion supra Part 11I.A.3.i, p. 21.
O'Donnell & Fendler, supra note 134, at 209.

142.

Id.

143.
144.
145.

Id. at 214; Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 217, 229-30, 237 (2000).
O'Donnell & Fendler, supra note 134, at 214.
Id.
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qualify as fiduciaries under ERISA.14 6 Other courts that agree with this
holding have followed the Seventh Circuit in finding that PBMs' business
practices do not constitute "discretionary authority or discretionary control
over the management of the plan because the PBM was contractually
prohibited from unilaterally changing negotiated drug prices with respect to
the plan and was not contractually obligated to pass along to the plan the
savings that the PBM negotiated with drug retailers."l 4 7 The court also
rejected the argument that rebates from drug manufacturers were "plan
assets." 4 8 Despite this trend, as noted above, some courts have declined to
address the issue or hinted in dicta that they would come down on the side

of plaintiffs.14 9
Lastly, ERISA also raises important preemption issues, as it "was
designed to provide a comprehensive regulatory scheme."' 50 As a result,
many state-level efforts to regulate PBM conduct may prove futile if their
statutes relate to an ERISA plan.' 5 ' This is discussed further below.' 52
B. Summary of Concerns
The behavior underlying the legal concerns regarding the business model
of the PBM industry is described well in Paragraph 58 of North Jackson
There, they list
Pharmacy's complaint against Express Scripts.'5 3
146. Chicago Dist. Council of Carpenters Welfare Fund v. Caremark, Inc., 474 F.3d 467
(7th Cir. 2007).
147. O'Donnell & Fendler, supra note 134, at 217 (citing Carpenters Welfare Fund,474
F.3d at 472-73); id. at nn.50, 79.
148. Id. at 218; Carpenters Welfare Fund,474 F. 3d at 476.
149. O'Donnell & Fendler, supra note 134, at 220-2 1.
150. Slade, supra note 134, at 411 (citing Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 217, 229-30,
233 (2000)).
151. Id. at 419; In Re Express Scripts, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-00862 SNL, 2008 WL
1766777 at *4 (E.D. Mo. 2008); see also discussion infra p. 101.
152. See discussion infra of ERISA, p. 101.
153. The legal concerns underlying PBM behavior are described there as follows:
As a result of the illegal agreements and/or conspiracies, Defendant has caused the Plaintiffs
to suffer financial loss in that Defendant, with its monopolistic market strength: (i) forces
independent pharmacies to accept reimbursement rates that are set at unconscionably low
levels; (ii) place on its formulary those drugs which affords it the highest "spread" and
therefore the greatest profit; (iii) receives kickbacks and rebates from drug manufacturers in
exchange for "pushing" its drugs on consumers which is done by placing a manufacturer's
drugs on the PBMs' formulary regardless of whether that drug is the cheapest or most
effective drug in its particular group; (iv) refuses to give pharmacies access to the market of
the retail sale of prescription drugs that are reimbursable by insurance except on terms and
reimbursement prices that leave no economic margin for the pharmacies' survival; (v) steers
health plan members to mail order pharmacies, which are owned by the PBMs, by
prohibiting retail pharmacies from providing more than a 30-day supply of drugs, while
allowing the PBMs own mail order pharmacies to provide 90-day supplies; (vi) takes
pharmacists and physicians out of the medical care equation by either limiting, or altogether
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allegations of monopolistic market power, pocketing pricing spreads,
receiving kickbacks, unconscionable contract terms, vertical integration,
and abuse of drug-switching practices.1 54
These practices, many of them intrinsic to the PBMs' basic business
model, represent a significant risk of violating a panoply of state and federal
laws. The potential violations include: restraint of trade through supracompetitive and/or coordinated pricing arrangements; attempts to
monopolize through the vertical integration of mail-order pharmacies;
unfair and deceptive trade practices in the concealment of rebates, the
creation of MAC pricing spreads, and drug-switching; self-dealing in the
vertical integration of mail-order pharmacies; and kickbacks in the form of
drug manufacturer rebates given in exchange for increases in market share.
The majority of these behaviors also raise questions of fiduciary negligence
under ERISA and false claims under the FCA. If repeated, lengthy, and
resource-consuming litigation is to be avoided, and consumers' costs
lowered, these are the activities that must be addressed in any prospective
regulation.
Admittedly, much of the material discussed above represents only
allegations and settlements, rather than verdicts or hard determinations.
Undoubtedly, it is also the prudent course of action for PBMs to avoid
litigation when at all possible.'s Yet, concern about PBM behavior extends
beyond those with a direct financial interest, such as pharmacies and plan
sponsors. A strong consensus among scholars and industry insiders has
also developed, citing major problems in the PBM industry and calling for
reform and/or regulation of PBMs. The CEO of one PBM, Navitus Health
Solutions, has decried the lack of transparency in the industry for leading to
inflated costs.15 6 David Balto has testified to Congress about the "market
imbalance" and "wide range of anticonsumer [sic] and fraudulent practices"
in the PBM industry.' 57 Others have written about financial conflicts of
interest in the industry and describe it as "inherently problematic."' 58
removing, their discretion to determine the fitness of a prescription drug; ... and (viii)
unilaterally imposes contract changes on Plaintiffs, including changes in reimbursement
rates.
First Am. Class Action Compl. at 20, N. Jackson Pharm., Inc. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 345 F.
Supp. 2d 1279 (N.D. Ala. 2004) (No. 5:03-2696).
154. Id. at 21.
155. Avoiding litigation limits negative publicity and keeps unflattering information out
of the reach of the public record. It also prevents the PBMs from accruing a track record.
Instead, they can point to a history of 'cooperation'.
156. See Zimmerman, supra note 19.
157. David Balto, Testimony Before the H. Health Care Comm., H..R. Wash. (Jan. 20,
2006), availableat www.reducedrugprices.org/av.asp?na=244 [hereinafter Balto House].
158. Johnson, supra note 6, at 367.
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Perhaps most damning is the National Community Pharmacists
Association's (NCPA) use of the FTC's own data to show that
it is apparent that PBMs promise savings on drug pricing while pursuing
their own interests in drug mix and total utilization. Where these
interests diverge at times from those of their clients, PBMs naturally
choose to increase their own profits and are not subject to the corrective
mechanism of fierce competition for a plan sponsor's business. Instead,
PBMs operate in a relatively consolidated industry with significant
vertical integration through a mail order channel that allows them to
pursue their discretionary interests, while concealing information on their
business practices. 159
These substantial and widespread concerns about the business practices
of the PBM industry lend extra weight to the numerous state and federal
investigations and lawsuits discussed above, leading one to consider that the
claims in those cases are likely more than mere allegations.
IV. CURRENT PROPOSALS FOR REGULATION
This daunting laundry list of complaints against the PBM industry has
not gone unnoticed by regulators and interest groups.1 6 0 Solving these
problems is complicated, however, by the fact that "no federal agency has
Scholars, trade
overall responsibility for the industry's regulation.""'6
groups, and state legislatures have all proposed various means of regulating
the PBM industry to eliminate perceived and actual abuses.162 The
suggestions range from laissez-faire private solutions to more
comprehensive regulatory schemes.' 6 3 They are discussed in turn in this
section.
A. Market-basedSolutions
Some commentators and scholars have proposed market-based solutions
to the problems arising out of PBM behavior. For example, Allison Garrett
and Robert Garis have called for greater awareness of PBM business
practices among plan sponsors so that they can insist on transparency in
their contracts.164 Thomas O'Donnell and Mark Fendler describe PBMs as
"just one cog in the wheel" of the prescription drug industry and likewise

159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

supra note 56, at xvi.
These are addressed in turn throughout this section of the paper.
Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 47.
Id. at 51-60.
[d. at 72-74.
Id. at 78-79.
DEMOS & STEWART,
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suggest that plan sponsors simply insist on more competitive prices from
PBMs.'6 5 The status quo of market mechanisms and consumer selfprotection even satisfied the FTC.166 The problem with this point of view,
in the words of David Balto, is that "those who have the resources for
monitoring the PBMs have in some cases done so, but their success has
been mixed. Often even sophisticated buyers have had to turn to litigation
to vindicate their rights." 67 Even when plan sponsors hire consultants to
advise them during negotiations with PBMs, the aid is negligible.168 It is
not enough to merely inform plan sponsors of the PBMs' business model
and expect them to negotiate concessions, particularly when it is difficult to
even expose the potentially pernicious effects of those practices outside of a
government investigation or pre-trial discovery.169
Others have argued that the market is already taking care of the problem
and claim that data cited to the contrary is outdated.170 John Malley and
Watson Wyatt point out that "the three largest PBMs-[Caremark, Medco,
and Express Scripts]-offer pass-through pricing at retail as an alternative
to the spread-pricing model."' 7' This position, however, ignores the fact
that at least a sizeable portion of the changes in PBM behavior towards
pricing and transparency is due to the consent decrees that came out of the
investigations by the states' Attorneys General and the Department of
Justice. 17 2 More importantly, these provisions expire after five years.73
After that, absent new legislation, the PBMs will be in the same situation
they were before the consent decrees.' 74
It is evident that the disconcerting practices of the PBM industry are
neither isolated incidents nor market abnormalities to be ironed out through
Rather, they are systemic problems directly related
informed negotiation.

165. O'Donnell & Fendler, supra note 134, at 237.
166. FTC PBM REPORT, supra note 51, at ii (finding "that competition in this industry
can afford plan sponsors with sufficient tools to safeguard their interests").
167. See Balto House, supra note 157.
168. See Rentmeester & Garis, supra note 5, at 976.
169. Even then, the availability of the information will be limited beyond the parties
involved, especially if the defendant PBM settles.
170. See John Malley & Watson Wyatt, Commentary, Response to Rentmeester and
Garis, 33 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 965, 971 (2008) (Malley and Wyatt's work as
attorneys representing PBMs raises doubts about the objectivity of their suggestions).
171. Id. at 965.
172. See supra notes 88-98, 112, 119, 127-133 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
174. See infra note 193.
175. But see Kevin C. Green, Regulation of Pharmacy Benefit Managers: An Economic
Analysis of Regulation and Litigation as Agents of Health Care Change 25 (Jan. 2008)
(unpublished manuscript), availableat http://works.bepress.com/kevingreen/l/.
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to the PBM business model that has developed since the 1970s.176
Situations like these are an example of when antitrust enforcement ought to
yield to regulation, a function of their complementarity.' 7 7
B. Existing Legislation
Seeing the problems inherent in the PBM business model and the need
for regulation, various suggestions have been made to shoehorn PBMs into
an existing regulatory or statutory scheme. Despite recent investigations
and litigation lending support to some of these proposals, they are
ultimately limited by their narrow scope and legal uncertainty.
1. ERISA and State Regulation of PBMs
As discussed above, several battles have been fought over whether or not
PBMs are subject to fiduciary responsibilities under ERISA, which would
bar them from continuing many of the business practices of which others
have complained.' 78 Commentators and state legislators have thus proposed
statutory provisions imposing fiduciary or fiduciary-like responsibilities on
PBMs.179 This, however, raises a second issue: are state laws preempted by
ERISA?so
In Lanigan v. Express Scripts, the federal district court in Missouri dealt
with claims under ERISA as well as state law claims.'"' The court
dismissed each of the state law claims, finding that they were preempted by
ERISA.1 82 To help clarify some of these issues, in 2003 Maine passed its
Unfair Prescription Drug Practices Act (UPDPA), which classified PBMs
as fiduciaries and required them to "disclose conflicts of interest, disgorge
profits from self-dealing, and disclose to the covered entities certain of their

176. Rebates & Spreads, supra note 11, at 946.
177. See Dennis W. Carlton & Randal C. Picker, Antitrust and Regulation (John M. Olin
Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 312, 2006) (manuscript at 22), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract id=937020; Naturally, a call for regulation may give rise to
objections on federalist grounds that additional government bureaucracy would only further
complicate the market and increase costs for all participants. Proponents of federalism are
caught in a catch-22, however, if they wish to see any reform. As discussed below,
regulating on the state level would necessitate voluminous litigation and thereby invite the
evil twin of bureaucracy: judicial activism.
178. See supra Part III.A.3.ii.
179. See O'Donnell & Fendler, supra note 134, at n.99; see infra notes 183, 187; But
O'Donnell & Fendler, supra note 134, at n.98.
180. Slade, supra note 134, at 411.
181. In re Express Scripts, Inc., No. 4:05-CV-00862 SNL, 2008 WL 1766777, at *5, *8
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 06, 2008).

182.

Id. at**13-14.
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financial arrangements with third parties."'
Subsequently, the
Pharmaceutical Care Management Association sought to enjoin
enforcement of the statute, arguing that the UDPDA was preempted by
ERISA and violated the dormant Commerce Clause. 184 The First Circuit
unanimously upheld the district court's rejection of both of these claims,
paving the way for the enforcement of fiduciary standards against PBMs.'8 '
Despite an appeal by the plaintiff, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for
the matter.186
As of June 2008, twenty states and the District of Columbia had passed
legislation instituting some form of regulation of PBMs, many of which
were based on one of the model acts discussed in more detail below.18"
California also passed such legislation in 2004, but Governor
Schwarzenegger vetoed the bill.' The organization Prescription Policy
Choices describes the effect of some of these laws:
Both the Maine and DC laws require the PBM to act as a fiduciary,
require transparency and pass-through of rebates and other
payments and savings, restrict drug-switching and conflicts of
interest, and establish guidelines for drug-switching and other
183. Nat'1 Legis. Ass'n on Perscription Drug Prices, Pharmacy Benefit Manager
Transparency
and
Fiduciary
Standards,
NALRx
(Nov.
20,
2008),
http://www.reducedrugprices.org/read.asp?news=2666; ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 2699
(2009).
184. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rowe, No. 03-153-B-H, 2005 WL 757608, at *5 (D.
Me. Feb. 2, 2005).
185. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305 (1st Cir. 2005).
186. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rowe, 547 U.S. 1179 (2006).
187. Nat'l Cmty. Pharmacists Ass'n, Laws that Provide Regulation of the Business
Practices of Pharmacy Benefit Managers, NALRx, http://www.ncpanet.org/pdf/leg/leg
pbm businessjpractice regulation.pdf (last visited Dec. 19, 2010) (providing a summary of
the following state laws: ARK. CODE ANN. § 17-92-1201 (West 2010); 2007 Conn. Legis.
Serv. P.A. 07-200 (S.B. 74); D.C. CODE § 48-832 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 465.188 (2010); GA.
CODE ANN. §§ 26-4-110.1, 26-4-118 (West 2010); IND. CODE § 25-26-22 (2009); IOWA CODE
ANN. §§ 510B (West 2010); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 40-3821 - 40-3828 (West 2010); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN.

§§

304.1-5 (West 2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22,

§

2699 (2009); MD. CODE.

ANN., INS. § 15-1601 (West 2009); Miss. CODE §§ 73-21 -151-159 (2008); Mo. REV. STAT. §
338.600 (2009); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 61-11 - 18.2 (West 2009); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 26.1 27.1-01 (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 59 § 356 (2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS. §§ 27 - 29.1-7 (2009);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-29E (2009); TENN. CODE ANN. § 56-7-3101 (West 2009); TEX.
Gov. CODE ANN. § 2158(H) (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 9421, 9471 - 9473

(2009)). For a discussion of the model acts on which many of these laws were based, see
infra Part IV.C.
188. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n, Schwarzenegger Veto of One-Size-Fits-All PBM
DisclosureBill Protects CaliforniaConsumers & Employersfrom Higher PrescriptionDrug
Costs (Sept. 30, 2004), http://www.pcmanet.org/pcma-schwarzenegger-veto-of-one-size-fitsall-pbm-disclosure-bill-protects-california-consumers-employers-from-higher-prescriptiondrug-costs.
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practices ....
[The Iowa, South Dakota and Vermont laws] seek
to address transparency, conflicts of interest disclosure, greater
transparency on rebates and other payments, and include more
limited fiduciary language ... .189
While the First Circuit upheld the Maine statute, 190 the D.C. District
Court recently held that ERISA preempts D.C.'s Access RX Act.19' It is
possible that the future of state-level regulation of PBMs under ERISA will
have to be determined on a circuit-by-circuit basis.19 2
2. State Antitrust Laws
In addition to the recent state laws regulating PBMs, states might also
continue to pursue enforcement under their antitrust and consumer
protection laws. The settlement agreements and consent decrees obtained
against Medco, Caremark, and Express Scripts have been fairly
comprehensive and addressed a majority, if not all, of the problems
discussed in this paper. While the restrictions imposed on the three PBMs
expire after five years, permanent injunctions may be obtained through
future litigation, if necessary. Of course, the problem with relying on the
threat of further litigation is that it fails to prevent future harm and offers
only an ex post remedy to a repetitive problem.' 93
3. Federal Statutory Enforcement
Likewise, oversight at the federal level could continue through the
enforcement of the aforementioned False Claims and Anti-Kickback Acts to
curb suspect pricing and drug-switching practices by the PBMs when
189. Prescription Pol'y Choices, PBM Fiduciary Duty and Transparency, 4 (2005),
http://www.policychoices.org/documents/PBMTransparency FastFacts.pdf (last visited Dec.
19, 2010).
190. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 305 (1st Cir. 2005).
191. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. D.C., 605 F. Supp. 2d 77, 88 (D.D.C. 2009), aff'd,
Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. District of Columbia, 613 F.3d 179, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2010
(however, this the District of Columbia Circuit held that ERISA preempted only certain
sections of the Access Rx Act)).
192. See infra Part IV.D (discussing the limits of current statutes and model acts).
193. It might be objected that such fears are baseless, as PBMs will be wary of trying to
resume conduct forbidden under the consent decrees and CIAs, lest the states resume their
investigations. However, the very nature of the behavior in question indicates this will not be
the case. The consent decrees center on transparency, which is by its own definition difficult
to monitor. Absent resumed complaints from pharmacies or a noticeable and unreasonable
increase in costs for government programs (which the PBMs could easily avoid by
restricting their more predatory strategies to private contracts), it will be difficult to tell
whether PBMs have begun a return to their old ways. Any efforts to determine whether they
are, and to prosecute them if they are not, will be expensive and, once again, too late to
prevent the harm already done.
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dealing with government employee and health benefit plans. Federal
enforcement beyond the scope of government-sponsored plans could be
accomplished through the Sherman Act and the FTC Act.194 As with statelevel antitrust enforcement, consent decrees resulting from any future
litigation would ideally impose permanent injunctions against problematic
PBM behavior.
Federal statutory regulation is also stems from the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (PPACA), though uncertainty exists due to regulatory
language not yet issued.'95 Although Senator Maria Cantwell proposed an
amendment to the America's Healthy Future Act of 2009196 that "requires
reporting by PBMs to ensure that savings from drug price negotiations are
being passed on to consumers and not contributing more to
pharmaceuticals' bottom lines,"l 97 this did not appear in the PPACA.
.Rather, the bill calls for greater transparency for health benefits plans or
any entity that provides PBM services.' 9 8 Instead, disclosures will include
information on (1) the percent of all prescriptions provided through retail
pharmacies compared to mail order and the rates of each; (2) the aggregate
amount and types of rebates, discounts, and price concessions that the PBM
negotiates on behalf of the plan and the aggregate amount of these passed
on the plan sponsor; and (3) the average aggregate difference between the
amount the plan pays the PBM and the amount the PBM pays the retail and
mail order pharmacy
C. Model Legislation
In response to the concerns outlined above, several organizations drafted
model acts as guidelines for statutory regulation of PBMs, and several
states have used these as the basis for their legislation.199 A review of these
proposals highlights several useful and effective strategies that may be used
to efficiently regulate the PBM industry.
194. This is at most unlikely and at best would be checkered. See BALTO, supra note 56,
at 2 ("Unfortunately since the early 1990s, the FTC has used Section 5 in a relatively modest
fashion.").
195. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, §
6005, 124 Stat. 119, 395 (2010).
196. Id.
197. Press Release, Sen. Cantwell, Health Care Reform Bill Includes Major Cantwell
Initiatives to Control Costs, Improve Quality of Care, (Oct. 13, 2009), http://
cantwell.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=318903. ("Cantwell's proposal requires reporting
by PBMs to ensure that savings from drug price negotiations are being passed on to
consumers and not contributing more to pharmaceuticals' bottom lines.").
198.

Les Blumenthal, Senate Panel Approves Cantwell Amendment, MCCLATCHY

NEWSPAPERS, (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/homepage/story/76404.html.
199. Id.
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1. NAIC
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) has
released an extensive proposal called the Health Carrier Prescription Drug
Benefit Management Model Act (the NAIC Model Act).2 0 0 Though aimed
at health insurance carriers (instead of PBMs), the NAIC Model Act has
noteworthy disclosure and drug-switching provisions. 201 For example,
committees set up to oversee formulary design must evaluate and disclose
potential conflicts of interest. 202 Section 6 provides extensive guidelines
regarding mandatory disclosures to pharmacies and patients in the event of
a formulary change, and there are also requirements for record-keeping.20 3
Most importantly, however, the NAIC Model Act provides that
[w]henever a health carrier contracts with another person to
perform activities required under this Act or applicable
regulations, the commissioner shall hold the health carrier
responsible for monitoring the activities of that person with which
the health carrier contracts and for ensuring that the requirements
of this Act and applicable regulations with respect to that activity
are met.204
This requires the plan sponsors, rather than a third party, to engage in
oversight over any PBM with whom they contract. The plans would be
responsible for ensuring that the PBMs, insofar as they are engaged in
practices covered under the Act (such as formulary changes), comply with
the disclosure and documentation requirements. 205 Though somewhat of a
roundabout way of influencing PBM behavior, provisions such as those in
the NAIC Model Act could be helpful to plan sponsors in the absence of
direct regulation.
2. NLARx
The model act proposed by the National Legislative Association on
Prescription Drugs (NLARx and NLARx Act), unlike the NAIC Model Act,
goes straight to the heart of anti-competitive PBM practices.206 The
200. Health Carrier Prescription Drug Benefit Management Model Act, § 1-22-1 (2003)
[hereinafter NAIC Model Act].
201. Id. at §§ 6, 10.
202. Id. at § 5(2).
203. Id. at §§ 6, 8.
204. Id. at § 9(B).
205. Id.
206. NAT'L LEG. Ass'N ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS, MODEL POL'Y: PHARMACY BENEFIT
available at
FIDUCIARY STANDARDS,
AND
(PBM) TRANSPARENCY
MANAGER
http://www.reducedrugprices.org/read.asp?news=2666 [hereinafter NLARx ACT].
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NLARx Act,207 based on Maine's Unfair Prescription Drug Practices Act,208
requires PBMs to act as fiduciaries and to adhere to transparency
standards. 20 9 Under this proposal, "[v]iolations of the act become violations
of a state's unfair trade practices or consumer protection laws."2 10
The NLARx Act also aims to prevent PBMs from profiting through
drug-switching. If a PBM substitutes one drug for another, it is required to
disclose to the plan sponsor any increase in price and to pass on the full
amount of "any benefit or payment received in any form by the pharmacy
benefits manager either as a result of a prescription drug substitution" or
from switching to a cheaper generic from a more expensive drug.211 This
requirement is also extended to manufacturer rebates based on increases in
market share.212 These too must be passed on in full to the plan sponsor.2 13
Lastly, the NLARx Act requires full disclosure of "all financial terms
and arrangements for remuneration of any kind that apply between the
pharmacy benefits manager and any prescription drug manufacturer or
labeler."2 14 These include arrangements based on formularies, incentives
for drug-switching, drug promotion, administrative services, and other
fees.215 The additional disclosure requirements are intended to prevent
PBMs from circumventing the other disclosure and pass-through
requirements concerning rebates and drug substitutions. Whereas they
might otherwise replace rebates with administrative or less-obvious
incentives, this section of the NLARx Act would require disclosure of those
activities as well.
3. NCPA
The most thorough and comprehensive (and most elegantly constructed)
of the proposed model acts is the National Community Pharmacists
Association's Pharmacy Benefit Manager Licensure and Solvency
Protection Act (NCPA and NCPA Act).2 16 The NCPA Act's novel addition

207. Id.
208. Unfair Prescription Drug Practices Act (UPDPA), ME. REV. STAT.
2699 (2003).
209. NLARx ACT, supra note 206.
210. Id. § 1.
211. Id. § 2(D)(2).
212. Id. § 2(E).
213. Id.
214. Id. § 2(F).
215. NLARX ACT, supra note 206 at § 2(F).
216.

ANN.

tit. 22,

§

NAT'L CMTY. PHARMACISTS Ass'N, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGER LICENSURE AND

SOLVENCY PROTECTION ACT, available at http://www.ncpanet.org/pdf/leg/leg_pbmmodel

licensure solvency-protection
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to the previously discussed regulations is that it requires the licensing and
certification of PBMs to be conducted under standards applicable to
pharmacies, and requires a state's board of pharmacy and department of
insurance to administer this process. 217
As part of a PBM's certification and re-certification process, it would be
required to disclose
[a]ll incentive arrangements or programs such as rebates,
discounts, disbursements, or any other similar financial program or
arrangement relating to income or consideration received or
negotiated, directly or indirectly, with any pharmaceutical
company, that relates to prescription drug or device services,
including at a minimum information on the formula or other
method for calculation and amount of the incentive arrangements,
rebates or other disbursements, the identity of the associated drug
or device and the dates and amounts of such disbursements.218
The PBM must also make all of its contracts available for inspection, and
all contracts and agreements between the PBM and pharmacies are subject
to prior approval by the Department of Insurance (who is in turn required to
consult with the State Board of Pharmacy).219
Under the NCPA Act, PBMs would be required to make further
substantial disclosures, specifically those dealing with certain types of
agreements. 22 0 These include agreements: with manufacturers to promote
their products or share rebates or discounts; to bill plan sponsors more than
the PBMs reimburse pharmacies; "to share revenue with a mail-order or
internet pharmacy"; and to sell data "concerning the prescribing practices of
health care providers in the state." 2 2 1 These requirements are aimed directly
at the underhanded practices alleged against PBMs in the previously
discussed investigations and settlements.222 The mandated disclosures,
combined with the audit rights granted to the Department of Insurance, take
significant steps toward assuring complete transparency for plan sponsors
negotiating with a licensed PBM.
The NCPA Act also provides guidelines to eliminate the abuse of drugswitching to increase rebates by requiring extensive disclosures whenever a
substitution is made. Substitutions of more expensive drugs for less
expensive drugs must be medically necessary, approved by the prescribing
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.

Id. §§ 5, 6.
Id § 5(B)(8).
Id. §§ 5(C), 10(C).
Id § 7(C).
Id.
First Am. Class Action Complaint, supra note 153, at 20.
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doctor, and "[t]he PBM shall transfer in full to the covered entity any
benefit or payment received in any form by the PBM as a result of a
prescription drug substitution," as described above.223
Lastly, the NCPA Act explicitly addresses the PBM industry's pricing
indices and mail-order pharmacy conflicts of interest. Under Section 14, all
pharmacy reimbursement rates must be indexed to the industry standard
AWP (for brand-name drugs) or a MAC price list dependent upon a third
party (for generic drugs).224 Under Section 16, PBMs are barred from
discriminating against pharmacies and specifically prohibited from dictating
co-pays and days of supply to pharmacies.2 25 Together, these two sections
take significant steps toward resolving the concerns created by PBM pricing
strategies and their contracts with independent pharmacies.
D. Limits of Current Statutes and Model Acts
Despite the amount of effort that has gone into crafting the existing and
proposed solutions to abuses in the PBM industry, the above approaches all
suffer from limitations in scope and/or certainty. First, regulation of PBMs
through False Claims Act and Anti-Kickback Act litigation is limited to
cases involving government contracts.226 While consent decrees resulting
from future litigation under these statutes could conceivably require
injunctions pertaining to all of a PBM's business, this would be a rather
ham-handed approach.
Furthermore, regulation under ERISA, though requisitely broad in scope
in conjunction with state legislation defining PBMs as fiduciaries, faces
221
preemption challenges from PBM trade associations.227 With early cases
already coming down on opposite sides of this question, such a strategy
would require extensive litigation in each circuit. Enforcement would be
left in the interim to a patchwork of jurisdictions upholding state statutes
that may or may not be later struck down by the Supreme Court. This is
hardly a lasting solution to systemic problems.
Even the new disclosure requirements enacted as part of the PPACA fail
to ensure adequate protection for patients and consumers. By allowing
reporting of discounts to be done in the aggregate, the law still leaves a
large loophole for PBMs to conceal conflicts of interest and obscure the
nature of their relationships with pharmaceutical manufacturers and
distributors.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.

NCPA ACT, supra note 216, §§ 11(D)(2)-(3).
Id. at § 14(A)(B).
Id at § 16(E).
31 U.S.C. § 3272(a) (2010); 41 U.S.C. §§ 52(1), (3), (5) (2010).
Slade, supra note 134, at 415.
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At root, the difficulties faced by the existing and currently proposed
regulatory schemes can be traced to the fact that they address the causes of
the problems they seek to resolve only obliquely. With the exception of
parts of the NCPA Act and some of the consent decrees, contemporary
approaches to PBM regulation attempt only to stretch or modify existing
legal categories in order to bring PBMs under their jurisdiction, instead of
dealing with the problems head-on by tailoring new rules to the unique
characteristics of the PBM industry.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR FEDERAL REGULATION

This paper proposes taking just such a tack. As noted earlier, marketbased proposals (such as encouraging plans to insist on transparency in their
contracts) are too optimistic in their expectations, particularly in an industry
described by one expert as oligopolistic. 228 The challenges instigated by the
behavior in the PBM industry are not anomalies that may be remedied by
occasional litigation. Rather, constant investigation and litigation would be
necessary to police PBMs and prevent or cure unfair and deceptive
practices. When abuse is systemic, it is the place of regulation, not
litigation, to solve the problem.
Yet, while regulation is needed, state-level enforcement and existing
federal statutes are limited in their ability to do so by their narrow scope
and tenuous jurisdiction.229 Regulation of the PBM industry, in order to
avoid unnecessary litigation, ought to be done at the federal level. This
regulation should forego substantial reliance on existing statutes in favor of
clear and direct limitations upon the specific anti-competitive practices that
illicitly inflate PBM profits, and consequently inflate the price of
prescription drugs. Like the NCPA Act, this federal legislation should
center on pricing controls and the disclosure of all financial incentives
concerning pharmaceutical manufacturers.
The legislation, however,
should also take a page from the AdvancePCS consent decree and
specifically prohibit practices such as MAC pricing spreads.
Going further, one might also argue that disclosure and transparency are
not enough. Although the rebates and financial incentives passed from
manufacturers to PBMs would be exposed, this does not mean that savings
would automatically pass on to consumers or, in the case of governmentsponsored plans, to taxpayers. Most of the proposed regulations only
require transfer of remuneration received by the PBM to the sponsor when
228. Balto House, supra note 157, at 77 (also noting the difficulties faced by
independent pharmacies attempting to negotiate with PBMs. Currently, they run the risk of
violating the antitrust laws if they attempt to collectively negotiate); id. at 78.
229. Slade, supra note 134, at 423.
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it results from drug-switching. 230 Since drug-switching, of all the PBM
business practices, actually poses the greatest risk to the patient's health, it
is certainly appropriate to remove all non-medical incentives to engage in
such behavior.2 3 1
When it comes to pricing spreads and rebates, however, disclosure,
rather than transfer, is the preferred solution.232 Presumably, plan sponsors
may or may not demand these amounts, but would use them to negotiate
their contract with the PBM. Ironically, proposed statutes like the NCPA's
are designed to prohibit- rather than merely disclose-this same conduct
when it occurs between the PBM and drug manufacturers.2 33 The
protection afforded under these regulations, then, is more for the plan
sponsor than the consumer. 2 34 Remembering that PBMs once operated
solely on a fee basis, and considering the context of the rising cost of health
care, it would be prudent to design further mechanisms to deliver more, if
not all, of the savings to the consumer. Inducing the disclosure of hidden
profits is hardly meritorious if the PBMs simply re-hide these profits-at
least not when done in the name of competition and consumer protection.
There are essentially five areas of concern in the PBM industry that any
future regulatory scheme will need to address: (1) coordinated pricing
arrangements that impose supra-competitive prices or restrain trade; (2)
monopolization through mail-order pharmacies; (3) unfair and deceptive
trade practices (rebate concealment, MAC spreads, and drug switching); (4)
self-dealing through the vertical integration of mail-order pharmacies; and
(5) kickbacks from manufacturers for increasing market shares. While the
current proposals for regulation make valiant efforts to tackle the latter
three of these problems, they do little to address the market power issues
raised by the first two. This gap will remain so long as proposals to
regulate PBMs rely heavily on disclosure requirements, rather than actually
proscribing behavior or mandating fee and pricing structures.
To this end, federal regulation should require PBMs to use prices
indexed to AWP at a statutory rate when reimbursing pharmacies (similar to
the NCPA proposal) and mandate universal reimbursement rates for
equivalent products or services from the PBMs' mail-order pharmacies and
other mail-order pharmacies. Future regulation should also mandate that
any and all manufacturer rebates be passed on to plan sponsors in their
entirety and that, for each drug, the PBMs use the one and the same MAC

230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Johnson, supra note 6, at 358-359.
Id. at 349.
Garrett & Garis, supra note 2, at 58-61.
Johnson, supra note 6, at 336.
Id.
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price list with the pharmacies and the plan sponsors. Drug-switching
should only be permitted when prompted by the patient's doctor, and PBMs
should be barred from contacting doctors to suggest a switch unless doing
so would reduce the cost to the plan sponsor or patient and would pose no
health risks. When providing mail-order pharmacy services, PBMs should
be required to give the patient or plan sponsor the option of which
pharmacy to use (the PBM's or a competitor's). Lastly, to minimize
kickbacks, rebates from manufacturers should be either capped or
eliminated.
Additionally, while regulation needs to be at the federal level to avoid
superfluous litigation, it is also desirable to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy
and red tape. Instead of creating an administrative agency at the federal
level, federal legislation should rely on the combination of the above
objective standards and delegate any discretionary oversight to the
appropriate state agencies. Taking a cue from the NCPA Act, this could be
accomplished by working with state boards of pharmacy and insurance
departments.
VI. CONCLUSION

Reviewing the recent history of investigations and litigation in the PBM
industry, it is clear that several practices involved in the PBM business
model are anti-competitive and, in some cases, plainly illegal. In fact, the
industry's very premise, to earn a profit by helping other companies save
money, involves a fundamental conflict of interest when operated on
anything other than a fee basis. Yet despite this, regulation of the PBM
industry has been slow and difficult to develop. This is, no doubt, at least
partly due to the vast amounts spent by drug manufacturers and PBMs
lobbying state and federal legislatures.235
It is not surprising, then, that the regulation and legislation passed thus
far has been a patchwork of enforcement under existing state and federal
laws, some with tenuous jurisdiction. The efficacy of these regulations is
further limited by the fact that they are addressed more to the symptoms of
the problem than the defect itself. Passing legislation on the federal level
will continue to be difficult, but neither the status quo nor a purely marketbased solution will fix the situation. Encouragingly, the PPACA may
provide a unique window of opportunity to implement the regulatory
reforms that are needed in the PBM industry by emphasizing the money
235. Pharm. Rsrch & Mfrs of Am., OPENSECRETS.ORG., http://www.opensecrets.org/
lobby/clientsum.php?lname=Pharmaceutical+Rsrch+%26+Mfrs+of+America&year-2010
(last visited Dec. 19, 2010) (reporting that PhRMA, a lobbying group representing the
pharmaceutical industry, has spent close to $20 million or more on lobbying since 2007).
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they would save for plan sponsors, consumers, and taxpayers. However, we
will not know the PPACA's total affect on the PBMs until rulemaking is
completed.
The ideal reforms would combine the strict pricing and disclosure
requirements of the NCPA Act with clear standards that explicitly and
directly prohibit the anti-competitive business practices frequently
complained of and stronger mechanisms to pass on savings to the
consumer. It should be noted that there is a caveat to this arrangement:
even with reform in the PBM industry, drug prices could remain high
because of manufacturers. That, however, is beyond the scope of this
paper.
What is clear is that pharmacy benefit management companies have
developed and grown into a business model that pits their profit incentives
against the financial needs of their clients and, at times, the health of
patients. Current laws and the majority of proposed laws cannot and will
not adequately address this problem. Congress should pass federal
legislation creating broad, comprehensive limits on the relationships
between PBMs and drug manufacturers to protect pharmacies, plan
sponsors, and consumers.
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